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The paper sheds light on the impact of spatial agglomeration of human 
capital on individual wages in Western Germany. Using panel data it 
shows that regional wage differentials are to a large extent attributable 
to localized human capital externalities arising from the regional share of 
highly qualified workers. Employing the regional number of public 
schools and of students as instrumental variables the paper shows that 
human capital externalities are underestimated in ordinary panel 
regressions for wages of highly qualified and non-highly qualified workers 
alike due to supply shifts of highly qualified workers. An analysis by 
sector reveals that human capital externalities are more pronounced in 
manufacturing than in the service sector. We find indication that highly 
qualified workers benefit from intra-industry knowledge spillovers, while 
non-highly qualified workers profit from pecuniary externalities between 
industries. Our findings are stable among a variety of indicators of 
regional human capital and robust to the inclusion of other sources of 
increasing returns, as well as wage curve, price level, and amenity effects.   
 
Keywords: Human Capital Externalities, Agglomeration, Urban Wage Premium 
JEL Categories: D62, D83, J24, J31, O15
                                                            
‡ Contact: heuermann@iaaeg.de; IAAEG, University of Trier, 54286 Trier, Germany; Phone: 0049-
(0)651-201-4749, Fax: 0049-(0)651-201-4742. I am grateful to Dieter Sadowski and to Jens Suedekum 
for their advice and support. I also wish to thank participants and organizers at the P&E Doctoral 
Workshop in Berlin, the IAB Data Workshop in Nuremberg, the Path Dependency Workshop at the 
Free University of Berlin, the SMYE Conference in Lille, and the SASE Conference in San Jose for 
helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors and shortcomings are mine.  2 
 
I.  Introduction – Human Capital Externalities and Regional Development 
“It is an odd fact that the economic basis for major elements of public 
policy and expenditure depends importantly on the size of one of the least 
well measured of all economic phenomena: human capital externalities.” 
J.B. Davies, 2002 
Despite the distribution of wages and human capital being uneven between countries and 
within countries alike, regional human capital endowments have rather late attracted 
attention as determinants of regional development. The link between human capital 
agglomeration and regional prosperity was first pointed out by early development economists 
like Myrdal (1954), Kuznets (1962), Hirschman (1958), and Kaldor (1970), who emphasized 
that the spatial agglomeration of human capital creates benefits over and above the private 
returns reaped by individuals. In contemporary economic theory these social benefits are 
usually regarded as resulting from either market or non-market human capital externalities 
(Moretti 2004a). Arguments based on technological market externalities have gained 
prominence through Arrow (1962), Romer (1986), and Lucas (1988), who argue that human 
capital externalities arising from uncompensated learning processes between individuals are 
an important source of economic growth. Acemoglu (1996) shows that pecuniary market 
externalities from human capital arise if firms choose their investment in physical capital in 
anticipation of the average human capital of their future workers. Non-market externalities 
from human capital frequently mentioned in the literature include reductions in crime rates, 
better informed voting decisions, or improved health-related behavior (Davies 2002).  
These theoretical insights as well as Rauch’s (1993) empirical finding that geographic 
concentration of human capital significantly raises productivity and wages have sparked a 
controversial debate on the extent to which higher urban wages and productivity are the 
result of positive externalities from the agglomeration of human capital. Although empirical 
studies show that a doubling of employment density increases wages and productivity by 
about six percent in the US (Ciccone/Hall 1996), five percent in European countries (Ciccone 
2002), and four percent in the UK (Anastassova 2006) it has remained contested to which 
extent this premium can be attributed to human capital externalities. Glaeser/Mare (2001) 
argue that while a large part of the urban wage premium is due to spatial sorting of workers 
with respect to observable and unobservable characteristics, human capital externalities 
increase urban wages by about twelve percent. In a similar vein Combes/Duranton/Gobillon 
(2007) assign a wage increase of about three percent to human capital externalities arising in 
French cities. In general, uncertainty on the precise magnitude of human capital externalities 
is rooted in substantial methodological problems of identification. Ciccone/Peri (2006) 
emphasize that omitted regional variables constitute a serious threat to the correct 
identification of human capital externalities and that neglecting shifts of supply and demand 
of skills can lead to heavily biased estimates. Acemoglu/Angrist (2000) employ an 
instrumental variable strategy and show that social returns from education range below one 
percent and thus are substantially below earlier estimates. Notwithstanding these challenges 3 
 
sound theoretical reasons as well as tentative empirical evidence suggest that human capital 
externalities are an important determinant of productivity and wages and therefore 
constitute an important piece in the puzzle of uneven regional development. 
  Given the ardent debate on social returns to education in the US labor market it 
comes as a surprise that only one study (Suedekum 2006) addresses the issue of human 
capital externalities in the German labor market. This general retention is startling since 
German regions are shaped by substantial differences in economic performance with areas of 
agglomeration being particularly advantaged with respect to human capital, wages, and 
productivity. Regional wage differentials in Germany are investigated by Lehmer/Moeller 
(2007), who identify a raw urban wage premium of about fifteen percent, and by 
Moeller/Haas (2003a, 2003b), who find a doubling of employment density to raise individual 
wages by about 2.5 percent with these benefits increasing with individual level of skills. 
Suedekum (2006) is the only study that directly addresses the issue of human capital 
externalities by analyzing the impact of regional human capital on employment growth. His 
finding that regional human capital endowments positively influence employment growth of 
low-skilled workers does, however, support theories of neoclassical complementarities between 
skilled and unskilled workers rather than explanations based on human capital externalities. 
Summing up it turns out that the fundamental question of the extent to which human 
capital externalities are a driving force behind the urban wage premium in Germany has 
hitherto been left unaddressed. The present paper fills this gap and investigates whether 
regional wage differentials in Germany can at least partly be attributed to human capital 
externalities. We employ an instrumental variable approach as a central identification 
strategy in order to distinguish human capital externalities from other sources of regional 
wage disparities. Our main concern is that regional shifts in the supply of skills and other 
unobservable variables might bias our estimates. We therefore employ the regional number of 
public schools and of students attending them as instruments for the regional share of human 
capital. The instruments are based on the idea that future urban labor supply is a valid 
instrument for today’s regional share of highly qualified workers. The intuition behind our 
instruments is that the regional number of public schools and the number of students 
attending them are both closely related to regional human capital endowments since students 
from peripheral areas more than proportionally attend public schools in urban areas, change 
to the respective city’s university after graduating from school, and from there enter the 
city’s labor market. Both instruments are exogenous in Mincerian wage regressions since 
individual wages can reasonably be assumed not to be influenced by the number of schools or 
the number of students. A broad band of statistical tests corroborate our theoretical 
considerations on instrumental relevance and exogeneity.  
Based on these instruments our analysis shows that in line with Moretti’s (2004b) 
findings for the US human capital externalities have a substantial positive impact on 
individual wages in Germany and that this effect first and foremost works through the 
impact of the regional share of highly qualified workers. This effect is not only stable among 
a broad range of indicators for regional human capital, but also robust to the inclusion of 4 
 
other sources of increasing returns, as well as to wage curve, price level and amenity effects, 
and, finally, to neoclassical explanations of supply and demand. Comparing our results from 
instrumental variable regressions to those from regressions without instruments we find that 
in ordinary least squares regressions the impact of human capital externalities is heavily 
underestimated for wages of highly qualified and non-highly qualified workers alike, a finding 
we attribute to shifts in the supply of highly qualified workers which reduce wages for both 
types of workers through partly shared labor markets. In addition to being the first study on 
wage determining effects of human capital externalities in Germany, our study adds to the 
literature by investigating the relative importance of technological and pecuniary human 
capital externalities. Estimating wage regressions separately for each of the sixteen industries 
in our sample we find strong evidence that while highly qualified workers mainly benefit from 
intra-industry knowledge spillovers, wages of non-highly qualified workers are affected 
predominantly through pecuniary human capital externalities arising between industries. Our 
instrumental variable approach furthermore shows that human capital externalities are on 
average about fifty percent smaller in the service sector than in manufacturing which we 
interpret as evidence for the relative importance of pecuniary externalities in manufacturing.        
The finding of substantial positive human capital externalities impacting on wages of 
highly skilled workers is not only of academic interest. It is also of prime importance for an 
adequate design of regional policy since it pinpoints a core conflict of objectives. A regional 
policy committed to the objective of efficiency is certainly well advised to foster the spatial 
agglomeration of human capital. This is frequently done today through considerable public 
investments into an infrastructure for the exchange of knowledge and information with 
knowledge clusters, science parks, and innovation centers being prime examples. This type of 
efficiency-oriented regional policy, however, stands in sharp contrast to Article 91 of the 
Constitution, which obliges the German government to promote an equal development of all 
regions Germany and to actively support the catching-up process of regions lagging behind.  
Section II sets the stage for the empirical investigation by deriving an econometric 
model for the identification of the impact of human capital externalities on wages; Section III 
summarizes the data and provides descriptive evidence on the spatial distribution of wages 
and human capital among German regions before presenting the results from the empirical 
analysis in depth; Section IV concludes.    
 
II.  Human Capital Externalities: Theory and Identification Strategy 
In this section we develop a simple model from which we derive testable hypotheses on how 
the share of skilled workers impacts on the wages of skilled and unskilled workers. We then 
contrast the idea of knowledge spillovers to other potential sources of regional wage 
differentials put forth in the literature, i.e. to labor pooling and input-output linkages as 
alternative sources of increasing returns, and to wage curve, price level, and amenity effects. 
From this we derive an empirical identification strategy which we think is capable of 
differentiating between these rivaling explanations. 5 
 
     Human Capital Externalities: Theoretical Framework  
The empirical investigation in this paper relies on a simple model, which is a modified and 
adapted version of Moretti (2004a). It is important to note that this model is compatible 
with technological externalities arising from learning processes, as well as with pecuniary 
externalities arising from firms’ expectations on future human capital. This all-encompassing 
model is in line with our objective to shed light on the overall size of human capital 
externalities in Western Germany. Like Acemoglu/Angrist, who with respect to the American 
labor market do “not to attempt to distinguish between these mechanisms, since they have 
similar implications” (1999, p. 6), we do not aim to quantify the relative influence of both 
types of externalities, an aspiration we regard as not very promising, and restrain ourselves 
to pointing out evidence for technological or pecuniary externalities wherever our results 
indicate the prevalence of either one. The model is based on a production function that uses 
two types of labor as input and exhibits increasing returns to human capital. More 
specifically, output in region j is assumed to be produced under Cobb-Douglas technology 
using skilled labor (N1j) and unskilled labor (N2j) as inputs:    
Y     θ   N   
   θ  N             (1) 
It is further assumed that productivity of skilled and unskilled labor θij is a function of 
individual productivity enhancing skills φij with φ1j > φ2j and of increasing returns arising from 
the ratio of skilled labor to total workforce in city j.         
log θ          γ  
N  
N   N  
         ( 2 )  
Obviously, with γ = 0 individual productivity depends exclusively on individual human capital 
with skilled workers by definition being endowed with a higher amount of human capital. If 
wages equal the marginal product of labor it is straightforward to see that with sj = 
(N1j/N1j+N2j) the logarithms of wages for skilled workers w1j and for unskilled workers w2j are:   
log      l o g           log           1  log      1     log        1     log  1         (3) 
  log      l o g  1           log          log      1     log         log  1      
      (4)
 
To understand what happens to wages when the regional share of skilled workers increases 
we take first derivatives dlog(w1j)/ds and dlog(w2j)/ds, which yields: 
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An increase in the share of skilled workers impacts on wages of skilled and unskilled 
workers in two ways, i.e. through human capital externalities γ, and through neoclassical 
supply effects arising from imperfect substitution of skilled and unskilled workers. Human 
capital externalities γ have a positive effect of the same magnitude on wages of all workers. 
Supply effects, in contrast, work in opposite directions for both types of workers; an increase 
in the share of skilled workers increases wages for unskilled workers and depresses those of 
skilled workers. Adding up externality and supply effects reveals that an increase in the share 
of skilled workers has a non-linear influence on both the wages of skilled and unskilled 
workers with this effect being unambiguously positive for unskilled workers and undetermined 
for wages of skilled workers. Unskilled workers benefit from an increase in the share of skilled 
workers through human capital externalities and through an increase of their relative 
scarcity. For skilled workers the effect of a positive supply shift depends on whether human 
capital externalities γ can overcompensate the negative neoclassical supply effect.   
These findings provide the theoretical underpinning of our empirical analysis. Based 
on this model we formulate three hypotheses. We expect a) the regional density of human 
capital to have an effect on the wages of skilled and unskilled workers through the working of 
human capital externalities, b) the effect of human capital externalities to be of the same 
magnitude for skilled and unskilled workers, and c) supply shifts of skills to have a negative 
impact on the wages of skilled workers and a positive impact on those of unskilled workers. 
The model emphasizes the necessity to find an identification strategy which is able to 
disentangle the effects of human capital spillovers from those of supply shifts of skills. If not 
controlled for shifts in skills, human capital externalities are prone to be underestimated for 
skilled workers and overestimated for unskilled workers. The solution opted for here is to 
estimate the impact of regional capital on wages separately for skilled and unskilled workers 
employing an instrumental variable approach. The challenge is to find an instrumental 
variable which is related to the share of skilled individuals but is constant enough over time 
so as to not be related to shifts of skills (Angrist/Krueger 2001). We decide to use the local 
number of public schools and students attending them as instruments for the regional share 
of human capital. Before elaborating on the validity of these instruments we briefly outline 
alternative explanations for regional wage differentials which have been discussed in the 
literature and which partly shape our identification strategy.        
 
Alternative Explanations for Regional Wage Differentials 
Alternative theories on the development and the existence of regional wage differentials 
comprise increasing returns arising from economic density, i.e. first and foremost matching 
and sharing mechanisms, as well as wage curve, amenity, and price level effects.  
Arguments focusing on localized increasing returns to scale go back to Marshall 
(1890), who identifies labor market interactions, input-output linkages, and knowledge 
spillovers, the latter one being synonymous to technological externalities from human capital, 7 
 
as core mechanisms through which spatially bounded externalities come into existence (see 
Rosenthal/Strange 2004 for an overview). Closely related to Marshall’s early categorization, 
Duranton and Puga (2004) distinguish between matching, sharing, and learning mechanisms. 
Matching approaches are based on the idea that a large number of employers and employees 
in a regional labor market increase the chances of a high-quality match between workers and 
firms which in turn increases labor productivity. In sharing models spatial proximity to 
producers and to consumers allows firms to economize on transaction costs, which in turn 
leads to lower prices, increased demand, higher output, and higher wages. Both matching and 
sharing externalities are broadly regarded as arising from the mass of economic activity in 
general, rather than from the concentration of human capital. Since, however, the density of 
economic processes is prone to be correlated with the regional share of human capital we 
control for the regional extent of agglomeration in our empirical analysis.  
Blanchflower/Oswald (1990) show empirically that with a doubling of unemployment 
average wages decrease by approximately ten percent, a finding since then known as the 
‘wage curve’. Notwithstanding the lack of an undisputed theoretical underpinning, this 
relation has been shown to hold to a different extent for practically all industrialized 
countries. With respect to Germany, Blien (2003) shows that a doubling of unemployment 
reduces wages by six percent. Since Suedekum (2003) finds that unemployment tends to be 
lower in cities than in rural areas we are suspicious that unemployment might be correlated 
with regional human capital endowments and account for it in our subsequent analysis.     
Roback (1982) was the first to show in a general equilibrium framework that regional 
amenities have an impact on wages and that the direction of this impact depends on whether 
these amenities are productive or not. Productive amenities by definition increase 
productivity and wages while non-productive amenities, in contrast, have a depressing effect 
on regional wages because workers having a preference for the respective amenity accept 
lower wages for being close to the amenity. Accordingly, Beeson (1991) empirically 
demonstrates that about forty percent of regional wage differentials in the US can be 
attributed to different amenity endowments. Whether or not land prices are a wage 
determining factor depends on the assumption of firm mobility. If firms display a lower 
mobility than workers they will compensate workers for higher land prices, since only by 
paying higher wages they can prevent workers from moving to places characterized by lower 
costs of living (Moretti 2004a). Firms are willing to compensate their workers for congestion 
as long as the costs of compensation are lower than the costs of relocation (Kim 2003). 
Yankow (2006) empirically shows that regional price levels have an ambiguous effect on 
wages. Brueckner/Thisse/Zenou (1999) demonstrate that the concentration of human capital 
increases with local amenities while Alonso-Villar (2002) shows that price levels are closely 
linked to the share of skilled workers. We therefore decide to control for regional amenities 
and price levels in our analysis. 
        
   8 
 
 Identifying Human Capital Externalities 
It is certainly true that “the principal challenge in any effort to estimate the effects of 
education on wages is identification” (Acemoglu/Angrist 1999, p. 2). The main obstacle to an 
exact identification of the size of externalities is the existence of unobservable wage 
determining factors on the individual, as well as on the regional level. In order to shed light 
on the impact of regional human capital externalities on wages we employ Mincerian 
individual wage equations augmented by regional wage determining factors. Individual wages 
are on the one hand determined by individual productivity relevant factors, all of which are 
familiar from a voluminous literature starting with the seminal works of Mincer (1974) and 
Becker (1975). In addition to individual factors we introduce aggregate variables to account 
for competing explanations of the urban wage premium outlined above. In its most general 
form the equation to be estimated reads 
log w      X    β   η  DHQ  H     η  DNHQ  H     Z   δ   φ U     τ P     A   λ   d     d    d    ε      (7) 
with wirt denoting the wage of individual i in region r at time t and Xirt being individual 
productivity relevant criteria including age, sex, education, experience, and tenure. In order 
to examine our second hypothesis, i.e. whether regional human capital exerts the same effect 
on different types of workers, we interact the regional share of human capital Hrt with 
dummy variables according to whether individual i is highly qualified (D
HQ), or non-highly 
qualified (D
NHQ). Zrt is a measure for regional agglomeration which controls for localized 
increasing returns arising from matching or sharing mechanisms outlined above. Urt, Prt and 
Art represent the regional unemployment rate, regional price levels, and the amount of 
regional amenities respectively. In order to control for unobservable effects we include dir, dt 
and dr as individual, time, and regional fixed effects. εirt is an error term with the usual 
properties.  
Our primary goal is the correct identification of the coefficients η1 and η2 in equation 
(7), which represent social returns to human capital. Our core identifying assumption is that 
no variable exists on a regional level which is correlated with the regional share of human 
capital, systematically influences individual wages, and is not included in the equation either 
directly or via an adequate proxy variable. The panel structure of the dataset enables us to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity at the individual as well as at the regional level by 
including fixed effects into the regressions. Fixed effects regression are however not able to 
account for supply and demand shifts of skilled and unskilled labor since these shifts are 
neither constant over time nor within one entity.  
In order to correctly identify the impact of human capital externalities on wages we 
use an instrumental variable approach (see Griliches/Hausman 1986). The instrumental 
variables used are inspired by Moretti (2004b), who uses the lagged city demographic 
structure and the number of land-grant colleges as instruments for regional human capital. 
We analogously resort to the idea that the future supply of highly-skilled workers is a valid 
instrument for today’s regional human capital endowment. Based on this notion we employ 9 
 
the number of public schools in a region and the number of students attending them as 
instruments for the share of highly qualified workers. The intuition behind these instruments 
is that the number of public schools which qualify students for attending university, i.e. first 
and foremost Gymnasia (grammar schools), and the number of students attending them 
increases more than proportionally with regional density. This stems from the fact that not 
every city is able to maintain a Gymnasium, which means that children commute to larger 
cities in order to attend this type of schools. A substantial part of the students attending 
Gymnasia change to the university in the respective city after having finished school and 
later in life often start their first job there. The fact that highly qualified workers often 
attend higher education institutions in the city they went to public school in can partly be 
explained by the high degree of decentralization of universities and technical colleges in 
Germany. Since 139 of the 326 counties in Western Germany contain a university or a 
technical college it is easy for young people to stay close to their friends and family during 
school and university education and, later on, when starting their first job to stay in the city 
they already went to school in. Since the plausibility of this home-bias argument is mirrored 
in numerous contributions on the notoriously low mobility rates of German workers and 
students (see e.g. Haas 2002 and Hillmert 2004) we believe that the number of public schools 
and the students attending them are relevant instruments for the regional share of human 
capital. As for instrument exogeneity, it is hard to see why individual productivity should be 
influenced by the aggregate number of public schools or students. Various statistical tests in 
Section III confirm our intuition on instrumental relevance and exogeneity.  
Some comments are in order with respect to the variables used in the analysis below. 
Our variable of interest, i.e. regional human capital endowment, is measured in four different 
ways. The preferred indicator for regional human capital is the share of highly qualified 
workers among the workforce within a region. Highly qualified workers are defined as those 
who hold a degree from a university or a technical college.
1 The assumption underlying this 
variable is that productivity enhancing knowledge is to a large extent embodied in highly 
qualified people and from there radiates to the rest of the workforce via knowledge spillovers. 
The downside of using the share of highly qualified workers as an indicator of regional human 
capital is that it ignores the distribution of skill among the non-highly qualified. Since it is 
quite plausible that human capital externalities are not unique to the regional share of highly 
qualified workers but to the average level of education of the regional workforce, we introduce 
average education as an alternative measure of regional human capital. We construct this 
variable by assigning years of education to each type of formal degree and from these 
calculate average years of education in each region.
2 Finally, in order to investigate whether 
human capital externalities are rooted in the concentration of skills of a certain type we 
introduce the regional kurtosis of education and the Hirschman-Herfindahl index as measures 
for the intraregional distribution of human capital.  
                                                            
1 Technical colleges (‘Fachhochschulen’) are supposed to be more practically oriented than universities and entry 
requirements are slightly below those for universities.   
2 Possible values are ‘no formal education’ (9 years), ‘degree from Volks-/Haupt-/Realschule and subsequent 
vocational training’ (13 years), ‘Gymnasium without vocational training’ (13 years), ‘Gymnasium with vocational 
training’ (16 years), ‘degree from a technical college’ (18 years), ‘and university degree’ (20 years).   10 
 
We use the absolute number of hotel beds per region as a proxy for a county’s 
amenity endowment. Using hotel beds as a proxy for amenities addresses the problem that 
the majority of productive and unproductive amenities are not measurable and sometimes 
not even definable. The supply of hotel beds in a region indicates that it is attractive for 
people to travel into that region, be it out of leisure or business motives. The number of hotel 
beds is thus closely related to the idea of amenities, since their number expresses how 
attractive a place is for consumers or producers. Of course the use of one single variable 
impedes the disentangling of the respective impact of productive or unproductive amenities 
and the sign of that variable is therefore ambiguous, which is however of no relevance here.
3 
Congestion is proxied by the prices per square meter of sold land.
4 We are not able to 
control for overall regional consumer prices since no such index exists on a county level. Land 
prices are an adequate proxy, though, since congestion unfolds price effects to a large extent 
through land prices. Secondly, land prices are the basis for the calculation of rents, which 
constitutes the most important item of average household expenditure. In accordance with 
DuMond/Hirsch/MacPherson (1999) we use land prices as a regressor on the right hand side 
rather than employing it to deflate wages, because the latter is subject to the unrealistic 
assumption that consumers do not adjust their buying or renting behaviour in the face of 
high prices or rents.  
Finally, as pointed out by Moulton (1990), standard errors of regional variables are prone 
to be inflated, since regional variables are not assigned randomly to individuals. Therefore, all 
regressions are cluster corrected using Newey-West standard errors with the share of highly 
qualified workers being the cluster identifying variable (Newey/West 1987; Rogers 1993). 
Since the Newey-West procedure is much stricter than required by Moulton we do not run 
into danger of overestimating the impact of regional human capital on wages (Hoxby 2000).  
 
III.  Human Capital Externalities and Regional Wages 
The Data 
The data needed for the analysis is taken from four sources. Individual data on wages, 
education, experience and further controls are provided by the IAB employment sample, a 
two percent sample of all workers holding a job subject to social security contribution (see 
Drews et al (2006) and Hamann (2004) for a comprehensive description of the data). From 
this spell data we construct a panel data set encompassing all observations made on the 30
th 
of June each year. This annualized panel data set contains more than 18 million observations 
for Western Germany between 1975 and 2001. The definition of worker status along the lines 
of social security contributions excludes self-employed workers as well as public servants. One 
                                                            
3 We have refrained from weighting the number of hotel beds according to regional population since a weighting 
approach is subject to the assumption that unproductive amenities have a greater weight. This arises from the 
fact most natural amenities are located in sparsely populated places. Weighting hotel beds according to population 
would more than proportionally increase their weight. In addition, using the number of hotels per region instead 
of the number of hotel beds per region does not make much difference, since they show a correlation of .922.    
4 We are using prices for sold land of all types, rather than prices for building land only since the data quality is 
by far better; both types of land prices display a correlation of .967. 11 
 
of the merits of the data set is its panel structure, which allows for tracking employment 
histories of workers over time. Another merit is that the data are very reliable since they 
provide the source for calculating social benefits entitlements, and employers are therefore 
obliged to submit them to the best of their knowledge. The flipside of data being generated 
from the employment register is that wages are top coded at the threshold of maximum social 
security payments.
5 While other authors have more often than not decided to ignore wages 
above this threshold and to employ a Tobit estimation strategy for censored data, I have 
imputed wages based on a strategy proposed by Gartner (2005), which predicts wages above 
the threshold from a full set of individual characteristics. Throughout the paper wages are 
defined as gross daily wages, which are inflation adjusted to the 2001 Euro level. The 
education variable in the dataset is a six-stage indicator, which contains information on a 
worker’s highest degree of formal education. We have corrected for inefficient and 
inconsistent coding of the education variable using an improved variable provided by 
Fitzenberger/Osikominu/Voelter (2006) and Drews (2006). Part-time employees as well as 
apprentices and trainees are excluded from the data since their daily wages as well as the 
determinants of these wages are incommensurable to those of full time workers. From the 
remaining 13 million observations on about one million full time employees in Western 
Germany between 1977 and 2001 we draw a sample of ten percent of workers to keep the 
data computationally tractable.
6  Drawing the sample and dropping the observations with 
missing relevant data leaves us with individual panel data containing 1,312,935 observations 
on 98,612 persons, which we have augmented by regional data from the German Federal 
Statistical Office from 1995 to 2001 provided via their online service GENESIS, by regional 
unemployment data provided by the Federal Employment Agency, and by information on 
regional population density provided by the Federal Office for Regional Planning. These 
regional data are available at the level of the 326 counties (“Landkreise und kreisfreie 
Staedte”) in Western Germany.
7 The regional density variable is made up of a nine-stage 
indicator, which combines the density of the county with the population structure of the 
wider region a county is located in. A precise classification is provided in Table I. In the 
regression analysis the differentiability of the data on the location of a worker’s workplace 
reduces from 326 to 267 counties, since in some cases small counties in the IAB dataset are 
either lumped together, or combined with core cities in order to impede decoding. The 
descriptive evidence on individual wages in the next section covers the full period from 1977 
to 2001; due to data constraints in the GENESIS data set we had to reduce the period of 
observation for the regression analyses to the years between 1995 and 2001, which leaves us 
with a set of 173,614 observations.  
 
                                                            
5 The ten percent of workers earning wages above this threshold, which increases from year to year, are free to 
choose to either pay the maximum amount of social security payments, or to leave the public system and insure 
privately. 
6 We have drawn a ten percent sample of workers and then added information on all available years for these 
draws; this way we have kept the panel structure of the data and can profit from it in the subsequent analyses.  
7 Counties are equivalent to NUTSIII regions; they constitute the top-down fourth layer of a five-layer 
administrative system in Germany and are either made up by a single large city (Kreisfreie Stadt) or by an 
administrative unit of several smaller cities or towns (Landkreise).     12 
 
Descriptive Evidence 
Regionally augmented data on agglomeration, wages, and human capital reveal an 
astonishingly homogenous picture. Maps I and II show that economic activity in Germany 
conforms to Krugman’s (1991) famous observation that “production is remarkably 
concentrated in space” (1991, p. 5). Map I is based on data provided by the Federal 
Statistical Office and contains the density of workers as measured by workers per square 
kilometer. Density ranges from below thirty to above 250 workers per square kilometer. 
Among the most densely populated areas are the cities of Munich, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, the 
Ruhr Area, and their respective neighboring counties. Sparsely populated counties are 
predominantly located in the northern part of Bavaria and in Eastern Germany. Data from 
the IAB sample reveal that more than 44 percent of all workers are employed in core cities 
above 100.000 inhabitants, which together comprise only five percent of the landmass, while 
about 16 percent work in rural counties, which together make up over 36 percent of the West 
German territory.
8 These findings are in line with the regional density indicator in Map II.  
Three insights emerge from Maps III and IV with respect to the spatial and temporal 
distribution of wages. Firstly, although Germany is characterized by a comparatively 
egalitarian overall wage structure, substantial regional differences in average wages exist. In 
1975 average wages in the poorest quintile of regions used to be below 45 Euros, while 
average wages in the richest quintile were well above 52.50 Euros. In 2001 average wage in 
the poorest quintile of regions ranged below 75 Euros and in rich regions above 85 Euros. 
Secondly, wages are related to the underlying spatial structure inasmuch as they tend to be 
higher in agglomerated counties and lower in rural counties. Core cities like Munich, 
Stuttgart, Frankfurt, the Ruhr Area, Hannover and Hamburg displayed an average wage of 
above 86 Euros in 2001, while average wages in rural regions like Upper Franconia or the 
Emsland stood at 72 Euros. This adds up to a raw urban wage premium of 19.4 percent when 
comparing rural to urban regions. Thirdly, a comparison of Map III and Map IV reveals a 
stunning persistence of the regional distribution of high-wage and low wage regions. After all, 
rich as well as poor regions have by and large kept their ranks over a period of 26 years. 
Turning to the dynamics of wages by type of region, Graph I shows that with the exception 
of the early 90s wages are monotonically growing; wages in all types of regions have at all 
times since 1975 followed the same pattern with wages in dense regions being always above 
those of peripheral regions. From this we suspect that while in general wages are determined 
in the same way in all types of regions, some factors, with human capital externalities being a 
prime candidate, have sustainably lifted wages in urban areas above those of rural regions.    
Maps V and VI display regional human capital endowments as measured by the share 
of workforce holding a degree from a technical college or a university. The top quintile of 
regions is endowed with a share of highly qualified workers of above 25 percent, while the 
share of highly qualified regions in the lowest quintile of regions ranges below 4 percent. The 
distribution of human capital is highly unequal between urban and rural regions. The share 
                                                            
8 We are referring to counties of density levels 1 and 5 here as defined by the Federal Office for Regional Planning 
and reproduced in Table I, both of which are defined as core cities above 100.000 inhabitants; population and 
areas of rural counties are calculated on the basis of county types 4, 7, and 9.  13 
 
of highly qualified workers ranges at 15 percent on average in core cities and is thus about 
2.5 times larger than in rural regions, where it reaches an average of 6.6 percent. Turning to 
the dynamics of regional human capital, Graph II shows that while the share of highly 
qualified workers has been rising in all types of counties due to far ranging improvements in 
general education opportunities, this rise has been especially pronounced in counties of type 
1, 2, and 5, i.e. in urban counties. These observations indicate that higher average wages in 
urban areas are to some extent driven by a larger share of highly qualified workers in cities 
compared to rural regions. However, ascribing differences in average regional wages 
exclusively to skill sorting effects appears insufficient since highly qualified workers in core 
cities earn 125 Euros, which is about 12 percent higher than wages for their equally qualified 
colleagues in rural regions, who earn comparatively meager 112 Euros.  
Summing up the evidence we conclude that, in accordance with numerous studies on 
regional development in industrialized countries, agglomeration of economic activity in 
German regions goes hand in hand with higher levels of wages and human capital. 
Descriptive evidence supports the notion that in addition to sorting effects human capital 
externalities may have a role to play as an explanation for regional wage differentials. The 
following regression analysis sheds light on the existence and the magnitude of human capital 
externalities as an explanatory factor for regional wage differentials while controlling for 
sorting effects and shifts of skills through fixed effects and instrumental variables.  
    
Human Capital Externalities in OLS and Panel Estimates 
Table II shows our results from OLS and panel estimation of equation (7). Column (I) 
contains OLS estimates for individual and regional determinants of individual wages 
excluding regional human capital. Since coefficients on individual characteristics are all in 
line with findings from a voluminous literature and do in principle not change between 
regressions we only briefly comment on them here. Age, gender, and experience all display 
the usual, nonlinear impact on wages, although the coefficient of age is significant only in 
regressions containing individual fixed effects. As expected, private returns to education 
increase with degree of education. Female wages are by about twenty percent lower than 
men’s wages and foreigners earn just about one percent more than natives all else equal. In 
contrast to individual characteristics, regional variables have a rather low explanatory power 
with respect to individual wages. In line with findings on the wage curve, regional 
unemployment significantly reduces wages. However, neither land prices nor amenities 
display a significant effect on wages. While coefficients on density have the expected sign, i.e. 
wages increase with the level of agglomeration, only one of them is statistically significant.  
  Introducing the regional share of highly qualified workers in Column (II) we find 
strong evidence for the existence of human capital externalities. Both coefficients of regional 
human capital are highly significant and an F-Test confirms their joint significance at the one 
percent level. The impact of regional human capital is, however, far larger for wages of highly 
qualified than for those of non-highly qualified workers; an increase in the regional share of 
highly qualified workers by one percent increases wages for highly qualified workers by .34 14 
 
percent and by about .09 percent for non-highly qualified workers. A comparison of columns 
(I) and (II) shows that all other coefficients with the exception of those of the density 
variables remain largely unchanged. In line with our insights from the descriptive analysis 
this observation points to a strong correlation between regional human capital and the extent 
of regional agglomeration. In column (III) we investigate whether regional human capital has 
a non-linear influence on wages as predicted by the model. The predictions from the model 
are not confirmed in our OLS estimates. In order to control for the sorting of workers along 
unobservable categories, we include individual fixed effects in columns (IV) and (V).  
When controlling for workers’ unobservable characteristics in a fixed effects model, 
the impact of human capital externalities on the wages of highly qualified workers increases 
to 1.1 percent while becoming insignificant with respect to wages of non-highly qualified 
workers. The finding that we have underestimated human capital externalities for highly 
qualified workers and overestimated them for non-highly qualified workers in OLS regressions 
is important in two respects. First of all it tells us that the extent to which workers benefit 
from human capital externalities depends strongly on their characteristics. We think that it is 
useful in this context to interpret these unobservable characteristics as a worker’s receptivity, 
i.e. as certain character traits which enable a worker to translate benefits from surrounding 
human capital endowments into own productivity enhancements. Secondly, our results show 
that sorting effects along unobservable characteristics go in opposite directions for highly 
qualified and non-highly qualified workers, a finding we wish to leave for further research 
here. Our results from a cubic specification are exactly in line with our expectations from the 
theoretical model. With respect to the wages of highly qualified workers, the impact of 
human capital on wages reaches a local maximum with a share of highly qualified workers of 
25 percent and displays a wage depressing effect beyond that value. The size of this effect 
appears reasonable to us since the share of highly qualified exceeds 25 percent in only about 
one fifth of the regions. In line with our expectations, regional human capital has an 
unambiguously positive effect on the wages of non-highly qualified workers.     
Three conclusions emerge. As expected from our first hypothesis, human capital 
externalities have an impact on the wages of highly qualified as well as non-highly qualified 
workers. In addition, controlling for unobservable characteristics in panel regressions suggests 
that a worker’s receptivity is an important determinant of the extent to which human capital 
externalities translate into benefits for workers through productivity enhancements. Our core 
insight from the panel analysis is that human capital externalities display a non-linear 
influence on wages of highly qualified and non-highly qualified workers which we interpret in 
accordance with our theoretical model as resulting from a combined influence of human 
capital externalities and neoclassical supply effects. In order to control for these supply effects 
we employ an instrumental variable approach outlined in the previous section.    
 
Human Capital Externalities: An Instrumental Variable Approach 
Although changes in wages caused by supply shifts are unlikely to be of substantial size 
within the short period of investigation between 1995 and 2001, we are suspicious that the 15 
 
coefficients of regional human capital partly capture the influence of regional shifts of skills 
and hence are not consistent estimates of the impact of human capital externalities. When 
testing for potential endogeneity of the share of highly qualified workers a test on seemingly 
unrelated regressions rejects the hypothesis of exogeneity at the ten percent level.
9 Since we 
cannot rule out the possibility of endogeneity we employ the regional number of schools and 
the number of students attending them as instruments for regional human capital.  
Statistical tests corroborate our theoretical intuition on instrumental relevance and 
instrumental exogeneity. The raw correlation of share of highly qualified workers per region 
with the number of public schools is .43, and with the number of students attending them 
.36. Our first stage estimates in table III(a) show that the coefficients of the instruments in 
our preferred cubic specification are all significant at the one percent level with an adjusted 
R
2 ranging above ninety percent. An F-test confirms their joint relevance at the one percent 
level. With respect to instrumental exogeneity, a J-test of overidentifying restrictions 
confirms that the hypothesis of exogeneity holds for both instruments at the one percent 
level. Since our theoretical considerations are corroborated by these statistical results we are 
confident that the regional number of schools and the students attending them are relevant 
and exogenous instruments for regional human capital endowments. 
Table III(b) shows the results from the second stage regressions which include worker 
fixed effects as controls for unobserved heterogeneity of workers. Our suspicion that human 
capital externalities might be intertwined with supply shifts of highly skilled workers are 
confirmed by the data. Column (VIII) shows that all coefficients of regional human capital in 
a cubic specification are insignificant, which implies that our instrumental variable approach 
eliminates non-linearities arising from supply shifts of highly qualified workers.
10 Using 
predicted values for regional human capital from our first stage we then estimate the 
influence of human capital externalities in a linear equation. Column (VII) shows that a rise 
in the regional share of highly qualified workers by one percent increases wages of highly 
qualified workers by nearly 1.8 percent, compared to .9 in the panel analysis without 
instruments. With respect to non-highly qualified workers, regional human capital 
externalities are slightly smaller with a one percent increase in regional human capital raising 
wages by .6 percent. Thus, while human capital externalities have a significant influence on 
wages of highly qualified and non-highly qualified workers alike, their impact is about three 
times larger for the former group. This finding not only runs counter to our expectation of an 
equal effect derived from the model, but also to Moretti’s (2004b) finding for the US that 
wage effects from human capital externalities decrease with level of education. We suspect 
that collective wage agreements in Germany, which set wages for the majority of non-highly 
qualified workers but only for a minority of highly qualified workers, might suppress effects 
from regional human capital externalities on wages of non-highly qualified workers (see 
Haisken-DeNew/Schwarze 1997 on the educational scope of collective agreements).  
                                                            
9 We use a test of seemingly unrelated regressions since a common Hausman (1978) test is prone to under reject 
the hypothesis of exogeneity when used on clustered data (see Baum/Schaffer/Stillman 2003).  
10 We have predicted the polynomials of the regional share of highly qualified workers from the same first stage 
regressions we used for the non-exponential term. This proceeding is in line with Kelejian (1971), Newey (1990), 
and Carroll et al (2004).     16 
 
Robustness Checks 
In table IV we investigate whether our findings on the existence of human capital 
externalities hinge on our choice of the regional share of highly qualified workers as an 
indicator for regional human capital. We therefore rerun our OLS and panel regressions for 
alternative measures of regional human capital endowments, i.e. for regional average 
education, the regional kurtosis of education, and the regional Hirschman-Herfindahl index of 
education. As outlined above, each measure of regional human capital is subject to specific 
assumptions with respect to the sources of human capital externalities. While the regional 
share of highly qualified workers relates human capital externalities to workers with an 
academic degree, average education takes the overall level of schooling into account. Using 
the kurtosis and the Hirschman-Herfindahl index addresses the suspicion that human capital 
externalities are rooted in the concentration of workers with the same type of education.  
Table IV shows that all indices identify strong human capital externalities for wages 
of highly qualified workers, but provide only very weak evidence of an effect of human capital 
externalities on wages of non-highly-qualified workers. These results from OLS and panel 
estimates are in line with our findings for the share of highly qualified workers as an index for 
regional human capital. The negative signs on the kurtosis and the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index require a word of explanation. In our interpretation, both indices in practice measure 
the regional concentration of workers with a high school degree and subsequent vocational 
training, since these workers constitute about seventy percent of the German workforce. An 
increasing concentration of this type of workers in a regional workforce is strongly correlated 
with decrease of highly qualified workers therein. The decidedly negative impact of the 
concentration measures might thus stem from a reduced share of highly qualified workers in 
the regional workforce, which indicates that this educational group, rather than the simple 
concentration of any other education type, is the underlying source of human capital 
externalities. This interpretation is in line with findings from the United States, where human 
capital externalities are frequently assigned to the existence of a regional ‘creative class’, i.e. 
to a significant share of academics in the population (Florida 2002).  
In order to control for supply shifts of skills we again employ our instrumental 
variable approach using the regional number of schools and of students as instruments. Table 
V and VI contain the first and second stage regressions. The set of first stage regressions 
indicates that the instruments are highly relevant for all our indicators. All instruments are 
significant at the one percent level in a cubic specification and F-tests strongly confirm their 
joint significance. The results from the second stage in table VI confirm the results from our 
previous analysis based on the regional share of highly qualified workers. Again, the 
coefficients of the impact of human capital externalities on the wages of highly qualified and 
non-highly qualified workers substantially increase in size when we employ an instrumental 
variable approach. In line with previous results, human capital externalities are about three 
times larger for highly qualified than for non-highly qualified workers. Although this finding 
suggests that the impact of human capital externalities differs with respect to a worker’s 
educational background we cannot rule out the possibility that this result is rooted in 17 
 
different processes of wage determination for highly qualified and non-highly qualified 
workers. Our findings also run counter to our second hypothesis from which we expected to 
find human capital externalities to be overestimated for non-highly qualified workers in OLS 
and panel regressions. Our results, in contrast, consistently show that human capital 
externalities are underestimated for highly qualified and non-highly qualified workers alike. 
This finding casts doubt on the assumption of imperfect substitutability between both types 
of workers being appropriate. Our findings rather suggest that highly qualified workers 
compete with both types of workers for jobs; thus, an increase of the number of highly 
qualified workers depresses wages of both types of workers alike, a finding which is reflected 
in our general underestimation of human capital externalities. Thus, non-highly qualified 
workers do not benefit from relative scarcity if the share of highly qualified workers increases 
due to competition between both groups; this notion is consistent with our lack of evidence 
for an overestimation of human capital externalities for either type of worker. This 
interpretation of our findings is in line with results from a broad literature on asymmetric 
substitutability between workers of different skill groups (see e.g. Katz/Murphy 1992).   
Three basic insights emerge from employing alternative indicators of human capital 
with respect to human capital externalities, supply effects, and their respective importance 
for workers of different educational backgrounds. For all indicators of regional human capital 
we find strong evidence that human capital externalities matter for highly qualified and non-
highly qualified workers alike, though we cannot say with certainty whether this impact is of 
equal size for both types of workers. Comparing our results from different indicators suggests 
that human capital externalities are first and foremost rooted in the extent to which a 
regional workforce is composed of highly-qualified workers, a finding which is in line with 
empirical insights for the United States. Finally, our finding that human capital externalities 
are underestimated for highly qualified and non-highly qualified workers alike makes us 
believe that in contrast to our theoretical model, substitution between both types of workers 
are not symmetric, but that supply shifts of highly qualified workers depress wage of both 
types of workers alike, since highly qualified workers can substitute non-highly qualified 
workers and thereby eliminate the latter group’s advantage from relative scarcity.  
Our final robustness check is based on the possibility that other regional variables 
included in our analysis might have a differential impact on the wages of highly and non-
highly qualified workers. Since in our specification we have not allowed these variables to 
exert different influences on different types of workers, we might have forced our human 
capital coefficients to take up group-specific influences from other regional variables. In order 
to account for this we split up unemployment, amenities, and land price levels into their 
respective impact on wages of highly and non-highly qualified workers and re-estimate our 
panel regressions. Table VII shows that the impact of human capital externalities remains 
unaltered for all indices. What we do observe, though, is that the coefficients of most other 
regional variables change considerably.  Interestingly, unemployment unfolds a substantially 
higher impact on the wages of highly qualified than on the wages of non-highly qualified 
workers. While this observation calls for a deeper investigation of the wage curve 
differentiated by skill group, it also gives rise to the suspicion that the system of collective 18 
 
agreements protects wages of non-highly qualified workers from regional unemployment 
pressure, which is in line with our impression that it prevents their wages to fully adapt to 
productivity enhancing human capital externalities. While the role of land prices and 
amenities remains ambiguous, we now find strong evidence of regionalized increasing returns 
arising from the density of economic activity. We leave the question to which extent regional 
variables unfold a differential impact on different types of workers for future research and 
turn to our last exercise, i.e. an analysis on whether industries are to a different extent 
shaped by human capital externalities.    
  
Human Capital Externalities by Industry 
Microeconomic theory regards human capital externalities as being rooted either in processes 
of knowledge exchange between agents, or in firms’ investment behavior with respect to 
physical capital. Since the importance of knowledge and physical capital varies widely 
between industries, the extent to which each industry provides a fertile soil for human capital 
externalities is likely to differ accordingly. In our analysis we have up to now treated human 
capital externalities as being independent of the type of industry they occur in. While we 
have of course controlled for the extent to which a worker’s affiliation to an industry 
influences wages, for example through industry-wide collective agreements, by not 
differentiating human capital externalities by industry we have implicitly assumed that they 
unfold their impact unconditional on the industry a worker is employed in. However, 
Krueger/Summers’ (1988) finding of substantial wage differences between industries 
encourages an analysis on whether these are at least partly attributable to an inter-industry 
variance of human capital externalities (see Haisken-DeNew/Schmidt 1997 for inter-industry 
wage differentials in Germany). The remaining part of the paper therefore focuses on the 
extent to which the size of human capital externalities differs between industries.  
  With respect to workers’ industry affiliation the data set enables us to differentiate 
between sixteen industries. We have rerun regression the panel regressions for the impact of 
regional human capital externalities on wages of highly qualified and non-highly qualified 
workers for each of the sixteen industries with and without instrumental variables. This 
leaves us with 32 results on sixteen industries contained in table VIII.  
  It turns out that in panel regressions without instruments the regional share of human 
capital has an impact on the wages of highly qualified workers in eleven out of sixteen 
industries. This impact always increases when we employ instrumental variables and becomes 
significant for all sixteen industries. Things are different when it comes to the impact of 
human capital externalities on the wages of non-highly qualified workers. In panel regressions 
we obtain only six significant coefficients, which further reduce to five when we employ 
instrumental variables. We do not find a clear pattern of changes in coefficient size between 
panel and instrument regressions. Even more puzzling is the occurrence of negative signs, as 
well as the frequent change of signs between panel and instrument regressions.  19 
 
Our finding that within industries the effect from human capital externalities 
increases for highly qualified workers but is basically absent for non-highly qualified workers 
stands in stark contrast to our previous finding that regional human capital externalities 
affect both types of workers. However, the literature on the industrial scope of human capital 
externalities provides a suggestive explanation. In this literature, the debate on whether 
knowledge spillovers occur within industries or between them has a longstanding tradition. 
While adherents of Marshall-Arrow-Romer externalities contend that knowledge spillovers 
mainly arise through learning within industries (e.g. Wheaton/Lewis 2002), Jacobs (1961, 
1969) and others argue that knowledge exchange between industries is more productivity 
enhancing than within industries. Our results indicate that the extent to which human 
capital externalities occur within or between industries is influenced by the educational 
background of workers. While we find within-industry human capital externalities to matter 
most for highly skilled workers, the impact of human capital externalities on the wages of 
non-highly qualified workers seems to work mainly through between-industry effects. Our 
cautious guess is that our results are driven by different types of externalities being of prime 
importance for highly qualified and non-highly qualified workers. Thus, highly qualified 
workers first and foremost benefit from knowledge spillovers arising from frequent interaction 
with colleagues who are employed in the same industry. In this case, the intra-industry share 
of highly qualified workers is the frame of reference within which externalities evolve through 
communication and intellectual exchange. For non-highly qualified workers, in contrast, 
pecuniary externalities play a dominant role. Pecuniary externalities arise if firms invest in 
physical capital in anticipation of the qualification level of their future work force. It appears 
reasonable for us to assume that firms take overall regional human capital endowments 
rather than only regional human capital endowments within their own industry as a focal 
point when deciding on future investments. While the idea that pecuniary and technological 
human capital externalities differ in their different industrial scope and in their applicability 
to different types of workers is very well suited to explain our results, it certainly remains 
suggestive here. Both notions have to the best of our knowledge not yet been investigated in 
the theoretical and empirical literature and remain worthwhile objects of research.  
Since the analysis reveals that within-industry human capital externalities have a 
highly significant impact on the wages of highly qualified workers in all industries we focus 
on highly qualified workers in order to further investigate which industries are predominantly 
shaped by human capital externalities.  
  The range of social returns to human capital extends from 1.28 in Social Security 
Services to 6.66 in the Production of Consumption Goods. An increase of the share of highly 
qualified workers by one percent thus increases wages between one and nearly seven percent 
in our sixteen industries. The most ostensible finding emerging from table VIII is the clear 
division between manufacturing and services with respect to the size of externalities. The 
average magnitude of the wage effects of human capital spillovers amounts up to 4.25 percent 
in manufacturing, while it stands at 2.11 percent on average in services. A potential 
explanation relates to differences in knowledge and physical capital intensity between 
manufacturing and the service sector. We do not know from the data whether manufacturing 20 
 
or the service sector is more knowledge intensive and it is therefore impossible to tell whether 
knowledge spillovers are more pronounced in one of them. The issue is, however, more 
straightforward with respect to physical capital investments, which can reasonably be 
assumed to play a more far important role in manufacturing compared to the service sector. 
It is therefore likely that pecuniary externalities in manufacturing explain a large part of the 
difference to which human capital externalities occur in manufacturing and in the service 
sector. This finding encourages the development of empirical methods as well as the 
generation of datasets which together are capable of discriminating between pecuniary and 
technological externalities, an undertaking we deem has not been followed thoroughly enough 
given the preliminary evidence on the substantial role this distinction has for the explanation 
of systematic differences in human capital externalities between workers and industries alike. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
Regions in Western Germany differ remarkably with respect to their human capital 
endowments and average wage levels. Relying on a model of increasing social returns to 
human capital we have investigated the extent to which human capital externalities are a 
driving force behind regional wage differentials in Germany. Various insights have emerged. 
  Human capital externalities are an important wage determining factor.  Employing 
the regional number of public schools and of students attending them as instruments for 
regional human capital endowments we find that the regional share of highly qualified 
workers increases wages by 1.8 percent for highly qualified workers and by .6 percent for non-
highly qualified workers. This result is robust to the inclusion of a wide array of individual 
and regional variables, as well as individual and regional fixed effects. Employing alternative 
indicators for regional human capital endowments we demonstrate that human capital 
externalities are to a large extent rooted in the regional share of highly qualified workers.  
Our instrumental variable approach enables us to disentangle the impact of human 
capital externalities on wages from that of supply shifts in human capital. We find human 
capital externalities to be underestimated by about fifty percent in simple panel regressions 
not only for highly qualified workers but, in contrast to our expectations, also for non-highly 
qualified workers. From this we infer that while an increase of the regional share of highly 
qualified workers depresses wages for both highly qualified and non-highly qualified workers 
alike due to a shared labor market, this neoclassical supply effect is overcompensated by 
human capital externalities impacting on the wages of both types of workers.  
An investigation of regional human capital externalities by industry shows that highly 
qualified workers mainly benefit from intra-industry human capital externalities, while wages 
of non-highly qualified workers are more affected by human capital externalities occurring 
between industries. To us this finding indicates that knowledge externalities arising within 
industries through communication and processes of learning are of greater importance for 
highly qualified workers than for non-highly qualified workers, while the latter are 21 
 
predominantly affected by pecuniary externalities arising from firms’ investment decisions 
based on overall regional human capital endowments.      
The importance of the distinction between knowledge externalities and pecuniary 
externalities is corroborated by our finding that human capital externalities are on average 
fifty percent smaller in the service sector compared to manufacturing. While we cannot assess 
the relative size of knowledge externalities, greater physical capital endowments in 
manufacturing compared to service make us believe that pecuniary externalities are a driving 
force for the size difference in human capital externalities between both sectors.        
  Our finding of systematic differences of human capital externalities between 
educational groups, as well as between industries, should encourage research efforts in one 
main direction. Empirical insights into the microeconomic mechanics of human capital 
externalities are necessary in order to understand the relative magnitude of technological and 
pecuniary externalities and the ways through which they unfold benefits for different actors. 
Theoretical models in this field are far ahead of empirical insights and it remains to be hoped 
that the accessibility of new microeconomic datasets enables researches to shed further light 
on the mechanisms through which regional human capital and economic prosperity are 
connected. A promising example is provided by Jaffe (1989), who investigate the extent to 
which innovation is related to regional knowledge spillovers by using localized patent data.  
  The core message to policy makers arising from our findings is that regional human 
capital endowments have an important role to play for processes of regional development. 
The formation of an educated workforce should therefore be a core strategy of regional policy. 
However, two caveats apply, both of which touch on the issue of equality. Any policy being 
committed to increasing the share of highly qualified workers among its workforce should be 
aware that benefits from human capital externalities tend to more than proportionally accrue 
to highly qualified workers than to non-highly qualified workers. Thus, this type of regional 
policy might at least temporarily increase intraregional inequality and it depends on the 
extent to which the gains from higher productivity are passed on to non-highly qualified 
workers that the tide of human capital externalities lifts all boats. Secondly, it should be 
noted that highly qualified and non-highly qualified workers exhibit different propensities of 
migration with the former being more mobile than the latter. With rising wages in human 
capital intensive regions patterns of selective migration are prone to induce a process of 
interregional divergence. In a dynamic perspective an increasing spatial agglomeration of 
highly qualified workers in regions characterized by substantial human capital externalities 
will result in regional divergence and interregional inequality. Such a process is hardly in line 
with the German objective of establishing comparable standards of living in all regions (see 
Tetsch 1994). An economic policy regime aiming to strike the balance between fostering 
prosperity through human capital externalities and promoting equality at the same time is 
therefore well advised to promote a regional concentration of human capital while at the 
same time “to increase the strength of the spread effects of the development impulses as 
between regions and between occupations” (Myrdal 1954, p. 81).    22 
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Table I – Classification of Counties as defined by the Federal Office for Regional Planning 
  Type of wider region a county is located in
















1  Core city in 
agglomerated region 
5  Core city in slightly 
agglomerated area 
2  Very dense county in 
agglomerated region 
 
3  Dense county in 
agglomerated region 
6  Dense county in slightly 
agglomerated region 
8D e n s e  c o u n t y  i n  
rural region 
4 Rural  county  in 
agglomerated region 
7  Rural county in slightly 
agglomerated region 
9 Rural county in rural 
region 
Notes: Agglomerated Regions are classified as such by the existence of a core city with more than 300.000 inhabitants and/or by 
a population density of above 300 inhabitants per sqkm; Slightly Agglomerated Regions contain a core city with more than 
100.000 inhabitants and/or are characterized by a population density above 150 inhabitants per sqkm; Rural Regions neither 
contain a core city of 100.000 inhabitants, nor does their population density exceed 150 inhabitants per sqkm.  
 
 
Map  I – Number of Workers per sqkm    Map II – Regional Density, as defined by the 












Map III – Daily Gross Wages by County,   Map IV – Daily Gross Wages by County 







Map V - Educational Attainment by  Map VI - Educational Attainment by   






Graph I – Dynamics of Daily Gross Wages (deflated) in Western Germany, by Degree of Density 
 
 




Table II  –  OLS and Panel Estimates  
  Dependent Variable: ln(wagei) 
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HQ  -  -  6.22 
(4.53) 
-  13.5 
(2.71)*** 
ShareHQˆ3 * D
HQ  -  -  -5.63 
(10.4) 
-  -20.6 
(5.91)*** 
Share HQ * D









NHQ  -  -  2.52 
(1.08)** 
-  1.87 
(.823)** 
ShareHQˆ3 * D
NHQ  -  -  -3.41 
(2.94) 




























































































































Ref.  Ref. 



























































Occupation Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region  Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Worker Fixed Effects  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
  No.  Observations  173,614 173,614 173,614 173,614 173,614 
No. Groups  -  -  -  39,758  39,758 
Prob(ShareHQ)=0  -  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Adj.  Rˆ2  (overall)  .4795 .4796 .4797 .2849 .2849 
Notes: All standard errors are cluster corrected by regional ShareHQ; standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1% level, the 5% level and the 10% level respectively; coefficients for constants are not reported here; 
variables  Sex and Nation are dropped in panel regressions due to perfect multicollinearity with worker fixed effects; Ref. 
indicates reference category for dummy variables.    30 
 
Table III(a)  –  IV-Estimates: First Stage      Table III(b)  –  IV-Estimates: Second Stage 
  Dependent Variable: Share of HQ      Dependent Variable: ln(wagei) 
 (VI)      (VII)  (VIII) 
 


































Ageˆ2  -    Ageˆ2  -.0002   
  (.00001)*** 
-.0002   
  (.00001)*** 
Tenure  -    Tenure  .003   
  (.0004)*** 
.003   
  (.0004)*** 
Tenureˆ2  -    Tenureˆ2  -.0001   
  (.00002)*** 
-.0001   
  (.00002)*** 
Experience  -    Experience  .009    
(.0008)*** 
.009    
(.0008)*** 
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HQ  - -5.17 
(13.2) 
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HQ  -  18.1 
(28.6) 
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NHQ  -  5.43 
(12.5) 
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Land Price Level  .0007 
(.0002)*** 
















Density 1  .265 
(.007)*** 




Density 2  .078 
(.009)*** 




Density 3  .089 
(.002)*** 




Density 4  .061 
(.002)*** 




Density 5  .077 
(.003)*** 




Density 6  .090 
(.002)*** 




Density 7  .064 
(.004)*** 




Density 8  .171 
(.002)*** 




Density 9  Ref. 
 























Occupation Dummy  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummy  No    Industry Dummy  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummy  Yes    Year Dummy  Yes  Yes 
Region Dummy  Yes    Region Dummy  Yes  Yes 
Worker Fixed Effects  No   Worker  Fixed  Effects  Yes  Yes 
 No.  Observations  173,614     No.  Observations  173,614  173,614 
Prob(Instr.=0) 0.0000    No.  Groups  39,758  39,758 
Adj. Rˆ2  .9167    Adj. Rˆ2 (overall)  .2764  .2800 
Notes: All standard errors are cluster corrected by regional ShareHQ; standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1% level, the 5% level and the 10% level respectively; coefficients for constants are not reported here; First 






Table IV – OLS and Panel Estimates: Robustness Checks (I) 
  Dependent Variable: ln(wagei) 
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-  -  -  - 
AvEducation * D




-  -  -  - 
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Density 4  -.019 
(.076) 











































































Occupation Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry  Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes 
Region Dummy  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Worker  Fixed  Effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
 
No.  Observations  173,614 173,614 173,614 173,614 173,614 173,614 
No.  Groups  - 39,758 - 39,756 - 39,758 
Adj.  Rˆ2  (overall)  .4796 .2840 .4794 .2850 .4795 .2847 
Notes: Regressions are augmented by the familiar full set of determinants of individual productivity, which are not shown here 
since they display the expected usual properties; all standard errors are cluster corrected by regional ShareHQ; standard errors 
in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1% level, the 5% level and the 10% level respectively; coefficients for 
constants are not reported here; variables Sex and Nation are dropped in panel regressions due to perfect multicollinearity with 
worker fixed effects; Ref. indicates reference category for dummy variables.  










Table V – IV Panel-Estimates: First Stage, Robustness Check     
  Dependent Variable:  Average Level of Education  Kurtosis of Education  Herfindahl Index of Education 






















































































  Regional Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 No.  Observations  173,614  173,614  173,614 
Prob(Instr=0) 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Adj. Rˆ2  .9203  .8010  .9067 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1% level, the 5% level and the 10% level 
respectively; regressions contain the full set of regional variables familiar from Table III, which are not reported here.  
Table VI – IV Panel-Estimates: Second Stage, Robustness Check 
  Dependent Variable: ln(wagei) 
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Average Education * D
NHQ  .098 
(.025)*** 
-  - 
Kurtosis * D








HQ  -  -  -.925 
(.102)*** 
Herfindahl * D
































































































Density 4  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 







































Occupation Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Worker Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 No.  Observations  173,614  173,614  173,614 
No. Groups  39,758  39,758  39,758 
Adj. Rˆ2 (overall)  .2534  .2818  .2826 
Notes: Regressions are augmented by the familiar full set of determinants of individual productivity, which are not shown here 
since they display the expected usual properties; standard errors are cluster corrected by regional ShareHQ; standard errors in 
parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1% level, the 5% level and the 10% level respectively; coefficients for 
constants are not reported here; Ref. indicates reference category for dummy variables.     33 
 
Table VII – Panel Estimates, Robustness Checks (II) 
  Dependent Variable: ln(wagei) 




















































-  - 
 
- 
ShareHQˆ2*HQ  -  12.85 
(2.76)*** 
-  -  - 
ShareHQˆ3*HQ  -  -21.72 
(6.01)*** 
-  -  - 








ShareHQˆ2*NHQ  -  1.73 
(.824)** 
-  -  - 
ShareHQˆ3*NHQ  -  -2.10 
(2.13) 
-  -  - 
AvEducation * D
HQ  -  -  .094 
(.007)*** 
-  - 
AvEducation*D
NHQ  -  -  -.007 
(.003)** 
-  - 
Kurtosis*HQ  -  -  -  -.007 
(.001)*** 
- 
Kurtosis*NHQ  -  -  -  .0002 
(.0002) 
- 
Herfindahl*HQ  -  -  -  -  -.292 
(.034)*** 
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Land Price Level * D










Land Price Level * D


















































































Density 4   Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   Ref.  



























































Determinants of Individual 
Productivity 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Occupation Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry  Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes 
Region  Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Worker  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
No.  Observations  173,614 173,614 173,614 173,585 173,614 
No.  Groups  39,758 39,758 39,758 39,756 39,758 
Adj.  Rˆ2  (overall)  .2833 .2836 .2835 .2829 .2828 
Notes: Regressions are augmented by the familiar full set of determinants of individual productivity, which are not shown here 
since they display the expected usual properties; all standard errors are cluster corrected by regional ShareHQ; standard errors 
in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1% level, the 5% level and the 10% level respectively; coefficients for 





Table VIII – Panel and IV(Second Stage) - Estimates by Industry  
Dependent Variable: ln(wagei); West Germany 
 (XXVI)  (XXVII)  (XXVIII)  (XXIX) 
Agriculture  Production of Raw 
Materials 
Production of Primary 
Investment Goods 
Production of Secondary 
Investment Goods 
Panel Panel-IV Panel  Panel-IV Panel  Panel-IV Panel  Panel-IV 






































Construction, Primary  Construction, Secondary 
Panel Panel-IV Panel  Panel-IV Panel  Panel-IV  Panel  Panel-IV 






































Transport and  
Information Services 
Industry Services 
Panel Panel-IV Panel  Panel-IV Panel  Panel-IV  Panel  Panel-IV 

































 (XXXVIII)  (XXXIX)  (XL)  (XLI) 
Consumer Services  Society Services (I)  Society Services (II)  Social Security 
Panel Panel-IV Panel  Panel-IV Panel  Panel-IV  Panel  Panel-IV 
































Notes: All regressions are panel regressions on individual gross daily wage, augmented by the familiar full set of individual and 
regional determinants of productivity as well as by density, occupation, industry, year, region and worker fixed effects, all of which 
are not shown here since they display the expected usual properties; standard errors are cluster corrected by regional ShareHQ; 
standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1% level, the 5% level and the 10% level respectively; 
coefficients for constants are not reported here; coefficients and standard errors for Amenities are divided by 10
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